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Brian Weatherson
I know a lot about the past. I know, for instance, that the Chicago White Sox won
the 2005 baseball World Series. I remember that’s true. I don’t remember the event.
I was in Australia, and it wasn’t on television. I don’t even remember the event of
learning that the White Sox won. But I remember that they won. And to remember
something is to, inter alia, know it is true. And to know something is to, inter alia,
have a rational belief  that it is true.1
So I have a rational belief  that the White Sox won the 2005 baseball World
Series. In virtue of  what is this belief  of  mine rational? That’s too big a question
to answer here, so let’s start narrowing it down. Is this belief  rational in virtue of
facts about how I now am, or historical facts about me? Call the former view a
temporally local theory of  rationality, and the latter a temporally extended view.
Which of  those is correct?
I’m going to defend the temporally extended view. In this respect I’m following
recent work by David James Barnett (2015), though being a philosopher I’ll quibble
about his argument, put forward alternate reasons, and so on. But I’m agreeing
with his big conclusion.
At least, I’m going to agree with a version of  that conclusion. I’m an evidentialist
about rationality, in a sense that I’ll try to make clearer as we progress through the
paper. So it’s natural to convert the core question into a question about evidence,
and about evidence acquisition. What is my evidence that the White Sox won the
2005 World Series, and in virtue of  what do I have that evidence? Is it the currect fact
that it mnemonically seems to me that the White Sox won, perhaps supplemented
with some knowledge I have about the reliabiity of  my mnemonic seemings? Or is
it something more temporally extended? I’m going to argue that it is the latter.
My positive view, inspired to some extent by the evidence is knowledge view de-
fended by Timothy Williamson (2000), is that the fact the White Sox won became
part of  my evidence some time in 2005, and has stayed in my evidence ever since.
At the time this belief, and this knowledge, was grounded in further evidence, pre-
sumably perceptual evidence of  what some computer screen looked like. But I came
to know the White Sox won, and this became part of  my evidence. An alternative
view is that the visual seemings from 2005 are part of  my evidence still. That’s what
the view of  David Lewis (1996) implies. And yet another view is that the content of
1Thanks to Maria Lasonen-Aarnio, Ishani Maitra, and the participants at the excellent Belief,
Action, and Rationality over Time conference for helpful comments on this paper. Special thanks
to Jonathan Weisberg, whose comments on the version of  the paper presented at Madison saved me
from a number of  mistakes.
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those perceptions, perhaps that ESPN is telling me the White Sox won, is still in my
evidence. I don’t like either of  these latter views, but I’m not going to argue about
them here. Rather, the focus is on whether evidence is contemporary or historical,
and I want to argue for the class of  historical theories over the class of  contemporary
theories.
1 Evidentialism
I’m interested in memory because it raises challenges for the evidentialist theory
I’d like to defend. Evidentialism, as we’ll start construing it, says that the doxastic
attitudes it is rational to have depend entirely on the evidence one has. This is a
version of  evidentialism. I’m taking this to be a thesis both about partial beliefs,
what are commonly called credences in the philosophical literature, and full beliefs.
I have a lot to say elsewhere about the relationship between full and partial belief
(Weatherson, 2012), but I won’t be relying on those views here.
I am construing the ‘dependence’ in the statement of  evidentialism rather weakly.
It is just a claim that the evidence one has, and the attitudes it may be rational to
hold, co-vary. Put another way, the rationality of  doxastic attitudes supervenes on
one’s evidence, at least throughout worlds similar enough to this one. I am not
defending the stronger claim that facts about what evidence one has are always
explanatorily prior to facts about what doxastic attitudes it is rational to hold.
It is easy enough to imagine epistemologies that aim for this more ambitious,
priority, thesis. David Lewis (1996), for instance, suggests we should understand
evidence in terms of  phenomenal states; two agents with the same phenomenology
over time have the same evidence. It’s arguable that facts about phenomenology are
metaphysically prior to facts about rationality. So, if  one was an evidentialist with
Lewis’s theory of  evidence, it would be natural to think that facts about evidence
didn’t just subvene facts about rationality; the former provided full and perhaps
reductive explanations for the latter.
I hold out no such hope for reductive explanations. Indeed, I’m closer in spirit
to the kind of  view you might read into Timothy Williamson (2000). As noted above,
Williamson holds that one’s evidence is all and only what one knows. This thesis
has become known as E=K. The notation here is instructive. It is commonplace to
introduce new terms by deﬁnition by putting the new term on the left-hand side of
an equality sign. A =df B means that A is deﬁned to be identical to B, not the other
way around. The E=K thesis suggests a form of  evidentialism where evidence is
in fact explanatorily posterior to rationality. Something is part of  one’s evidence in
virtue of  the fact that one knows it, and arguably one only knows what one rationally
believes.
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I’ve been a bit coy in the previous paragraph about what I’m attributing to
Williamson, and what I’m just saying can be read into him. That’s because the
view Williamson defends is not that rationality has explanatory priority, but that
knowledge does. As he says in the ﬁrst line of  his book, his view is “knowledge
ﬁrst” (Williamson, 2000, v). And it’s consistent with ‘knowledge ﬁrst’ to say that
the explanatory relationship between evidence and rationality is complicated and
multi-directional. Although I don’t endorse the knowledge ﬁrst program, I agree
with that last conclusion. The explanatory relationship between evidence and ratio-
nality is complicated and multi-directional. Evidentialism should not be construed
as denying this claim.
The other way in which my version of  evidentialism is weaker than it may be
is that it really is restricted to being a claim about rationality. It isn’t a claim about
justiﬁcation. For all I say here, maybe something other than evidence determines
whether a doxastic attitude is justiﬁed. For example, it may be that only true be-
liefs are justiﬁed. I don’t think that’s true, but if  it is it would be consistent with
evidentialism as I’m construing it.
More importantly for what follows, evidentialism also isn’t a claim about wis-
dom. It is very important to keep evaluations of  agents apart from evaluations of
acts or states. It is attitudes or states that are in the ﬁrst instance rational or irra-
tional. We can talk about rational or irrational agents, but such notions are deriva-
tive. Rational agents are those generally disposed to have rational attitudes, or be
in rational states. Wisdom, on the other hand, is in the ﬁrst instance a property of
agents. Again, we can generalise the term to attitudes or states. A wise decision,
for instance, is one that a wise person would make. But the wisdom of  agents is ex-
planatorily and analytically prior to the wisdom of  their acts, judgments, decisions
and attitudes. (I think that everything I’ve said in this paragraph is true of  ordinary
English. But I’m not committed to that, and it doesn’t matter if  I’m wrong. You
can read this paragraph as stipulating that ‘rational’ is to be used as a term that in
the ﬁrst instance applies to states, and ‘wise’ is to be used as a term that in the ﬁrst
instance applies to agents, and little will be lost.)
Evidentialism is not a claim about the nature of  wise agents. Perhaps a wise
agent is one who always has rational attitudes. If  so, then evidentialism will have
quite strong implications for what wise agents are like. But that connection between
wisdom and rationality is far from an obvious conceptual truth. For all I’ve said, it
may well be wise to have doxastic attitudes that do not track one’s evidence. That
is consistent with evidentialism, provided we understand the relevant situations as
being ones where it is unwise to have rational attitudes.
The most important recent work on the connection between rationality and wis-
dom is by Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (2010, 2014). And I agree with almost everything
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she says about the connection. The biggest difference between us is terminological.
She uses ‘reasonable’ and ‘reasonableness’ where I use ‘wise’ and ‘wisdom’. In my
idiolect, I ﬁnd it too easy to confuse ‘rational’ and ‘reasonable’. So I’m using a dif-
ferent term, and one that, to me at least, more strongly suggests a focus on agents,
not states. But this is a small point, and everything I say about the distinction draws
heavily on Lasonen-Aarnio’s work.
Finally, I’m not taking evidentialism to be committed to any kind of  uniqueness
thesis. It may be that different agents with the same evidence can have different
views about p, and both be rational. That’s ﬁne, as long as any agent with just
that evidence could have either view about p and be rational. The view is that
there’s a function from evidence and attitude to rational evaluation, not that there’s
a function from evidence to rational attitude.
2 Memory and Testimony
It’s natural to think about theories of  memory by analogy to theories of  testimony.
Indeed, we see this strategy used in otherwise very different work by Sarah Moss
(2012) and David James Barnett (2015). Moss and Barnett have very different views
on memory, and very different views on the relationship between memory and tes-
timony, but they both ﬁnd it worthwhile to situate views about memory in relation
to views about testimony. And I will follow this lead.
For an evidentialist, there are three interesting classes of  theories of  testimony.
These almost, but not quite, track onto familiar categories of  theories in the litera-
ture on testimony. I’ll use slightly idiosyncratic names for them, just to indicate that
the categories aren’t exactly the same. In all cases, speaker S says that p on the basis
of  evidence E, and hearer H hears (and understands) the speaker. (And I’ll assume
S is a she, and H a he.) I’m going to start with the case where S knows that p, and
H has no reason to doubt S’s testimony; we’ll look at the complications that ensue
when those assumptions are dropped presently.
The classes I’m interested in are divided by their answers to two questions:
1. Is the evidence that H gets, in the ﬁrst instance, that p, or that S said that p?
2. If  the evidence is only that S said that p, is the fact that S said that p a ‘self
sufﬁcient’ reason to believe that p, or does it need to be supplemented?
The term ‘self  sufﬁcient’ is borrowed from Anna-Sara Malmgren (2006), who uses
it in describing work by Crispin Wright (2002, 2004), James Pryor (2004) and Roger
White (2005). Wright, Pryor and White are primarily concerned with whether per-
ceptual appearances are self  sufﬁcient reasons to believe their contents, or they need
to be supplemented. That isn’t the focus here; like Malmgren I’m focussing on tes-
timony and memory.
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Here are the three classes of  views that you get from the natural answers to those
questions.
Indirect Theories of  Testimony. The evidence is that S said that p, and this is
not a self-sufﬁcient reason to believe that p. This class closely corresponds to
the class of  so-called reductionist theories of  testimony. Jennifer Lackey (2008)
provides an important recent indirect theory.
Direct Theories of  Testimony. The evidence is that S said that p, and this is a
self-sufﬁcient (though defeasible) reason to believe that p. Many theorists who
reject reductionism about testimony endorse what I’m calling a direct theory.
C. A. J. Coady (1995) provides an important recent direct theory.
Transmission Theories of  Testimony. The evidence is that p, so it doesn’t mat-
ter how we answer the second question. Frederick Schmitt (2006) provides
an important recent transmission theory.
Transmission theories need not deny that H also gets the evidence that S said
that p. And they need not take a stand on how good that evidence is as evidence that
p. And direct theories need not deny that H may have independent evidence that if
S says that p, then p is true. But in the other direction, I’m taking it as characteristic
of  the theories that they deny the core claims of  the ones that come after them. So
indirect theories deny that H immediately gets evidence that p, or that S says that p
is a self  sufﬁcient reason to believe p. And direct theories deny that H immediately
gets evidence that p.
The direct and transmission theories just say that a certain thing is possible. I
haven’t said yet what they have to say about when it possible. To make matters a little
less abstract, I’ll focus for now on theories that abide by the following constraints.
 S saying that p is only reason to believe that p in the absence of  evidence
against p, and in the absence of  evidence against S’s reliability.
 H only gets to add p to their stock of  evidence if  it was in S’s stock of  evidence
to start with; testimony doesn’t generate evidence, except for evidence about
what is said.
A direct theory that didn’t comply with the ﬁrst constraint really would be a charter
for gullibility. Even with this constraint, direct theories possibly are too gullible, as
Elizabeth Fricker (1994) has argued, but without this constraint they certainly are.
And a transmission theory that didn’t comply with the second constraint would not
deserve the name transmission; it would be a generative theory.
We can use these categories to draw three similar categories of  memory. Here
the case is that M forms a belief  that p at t1, and has an apparent memory of p at
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t2. As we might put it, her memory reports that p at this time. As above, start with
the simple case where M knows p at t1, and there is no counterevidence, or reason
to doubt her own reliability, at later times. We’ll come back, in great detail, to cases
where those assumptions are relaxed. What evidence does M get, in these simple
cases, when her memory reports that p, and how good is this evidence?
Indirect Theories of  Memory The evidence is that M ’s memory reports that p,
and this is not a self  sufﬁcient reason to believe that p.
Direct Theories of  Memory The evidence is that M ’s memory reports that p,
and this is a self  sufﬁcient reason to believe that p.
Transmission Theories of  Memory The evidence is that p.
The ﬁrst two theories are temporally local, in the sense I started with, and the
last is temporally extended. Again, we’ll put some restrictions in place.
 Memory’s reporting that p is only a self  sufﬁcient reason to believe that p in the
absence of  either evidence against p, or evidence that memory is unreliable.
 Memory only transmits evidence that p if p was genuinely among M ’s pieces
of  evidence at an earlier time. And that requires, I’m assuming, that M knew
that p at the earlier time.2
Since I want to defend a temporally extended theory, that means I’m defending the
transmission theory. And like Barnett, I do so while rejecting the corresponding
theory of  testimony.3 But once we set things out this way, we see that there are two
distinct temporally local theories, and they fail for slightly different reasons. Before
we get to why they fail, we’ll look at a reason for thinking one or other of  them must
work.
3 Shangri La
The Shangri La case introduced by Frank Arntzenius (2003) can be used to generate
an argument that evidentialists are committed to the temporally local approach
to evidence. This isn’t exactly how Arntzenius introduced it; he introduced it as
a puzzle for conditionalisation. But the argument I’m interested in is related to
the puzzle Arntzenius introduced. Here is how Michael Titelbaum describes the
example.
2As with the transmissive view on testimony, I don’t take it to be essential to the transmissive
view that all mnemonic knowledge is transmitted. Perhaps, as Lackey (2005) argues, memory can
sometimes generate new knowledge. Even so, as long as it sometimes plays a purely preservative role,
the transmissive theory is true.
3Michael Dummett (1994) also defends a transmissive account of  memory, though the analogy be-
tween testimony and memory is important in his argument. Jérôme Dokic (2001) endorses Dummett’s
position on memory.
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You have reached a fork in the road to Shangri La. The guardians of
the tower will ﬂip a fair coin to determine your path. If  it comes up
heads, you will travel the Path by the Mountains; if  it comes up tails,
you will travel the Path by the Sea. Once you reach Shangri La, if  you
have traveled the Path by the Sea the guardians will alter your memory
so you remember having traveled the Path by the Mountains. If  you
travel the Path by the Mountains they will leave your memory intact.
Either way, once in Shangri La you will remember having traveled the
Path by the Mountains. The guardians explain this entire arrangement
to you, you believe their words with certainty, they ﬂip the coin, and you
follow your path. What does ideal rationality require of  your degree of
belief  in heads once you reach Shangri La. (Titelbaum, 2014, 120)
The name of  the person Titelbaum’s narrator is addressing isn’t given, so we’ll call
him Hugh. And we’ll focus on the case where Hugh actually travels by the Moun-
tains.
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Figure 1.1: Original Shangri La game; Hugh takes the right-hand path
There is something very puzzling about Hugh’s case. On the one hand many
philosophers (including Arntzenius and Titelbaum) report a strong intuition that
once in Shangri La, Hugh should have equal conﬁdence that he came by the moun-
tains as that he came by the sea. On the other hand, it’s hard to tell a dynamic story
that makes sense of  that. When he is on the Path by the Mountans, Hugh clearly
knows that he is on that path. It isn’t part of  the story that the paths are so con-
fusingly marked that it is hard to tell which one one is on. Then Hugh gets to
Shangri La and, well, nothing happens. The most straightforward dynamic story
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about Hugh’s credences would suggest that, unless something happens, he should
simply retain his certainty that he was on the Path by the Mountains.
And you might think evidentialism is committed to the same thing as that dy-
namic story. To see why, imagine that Hugh is being terriﬁcally sneaky, and wearing
a small camera in his glasses. The camera is tracking what he sees, and Laurie is
watching it on a distant TV monitor. The guardians can’t do anything to Laurie’s
memory, so they don’t, just like they don’t do anything to Hugh. That night, it
might seem Hugh and Laurie have the same evidence. Yet, according to some intu-
itions, it is rational for Laurie to believe that Hugh took the Path by the Mountains,
and not rational for Hugh to believe this.
Here’s a natural way out of  that bind. Say that the evidence Hugh and Laurie
have does not consist of  what they saw as Hugh was ascending, but their current
mnemonic seemings. Now their evidence is different. Hugh has the evidence that it
seems to Hugh that Hugh ascended via the mountains, and Laurie has the evidence
that it seems to Laurie that Hugh ascended via the mountains. And it is common
knowledge that in either this world or a nearby one, Hugh’s mnemonic seemings
are unreliable, while Laurie’s are reliable in all nearby worlds. So the temporally
local theories can handle the problem, while one might think temporally extended
theories cannot.
The most straightforward way to explain the common intuition about Shangri
La is via the indirect theory of  memory. On that theory, Hugh won’t know that he
came to Shangri La via the mountains. That’s because the report of  his memory,
“We got here via the mountains, Hugh!”, would be the same however he came up,
and Hugh knows it. There is no basic entitlement, on this theory, to move from
My memory says that p to p, and since Hugh does not even believe that a correlation
obtains in practice between what he believes about his method of  ascent and how
he actually ascended, there is no earned entitlement.
It is a little tempting to read some of  the published arguments that Hugh can’t
know he came via the mountains as reasoning in just this way. Here is Arntzenius’s
central argument. (Assume Arntzenius is talking to Hugh here, so ‘you’ picks out
Hugh.)
For you will know that he would have had the memories that you have
either way, and hence you know that the only relevant information that
you have is that the coin was fair. (Arntzenius, 2003, 356)
Sarah Moss (2012) makes a similar claim about the case. (Again, her narration is
addressed to Hugh.)
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Intuitively, even if  you travel on the mountain path, you should have .5
credence when you gets to Shangri La that the coin landed heads. This
is a case of  abnormal updating: once you arrive in Shangri La, you can
no longer be sure that you traveled on the mountain path, because you
can no longer trust your apparent memory. (Moss, 2012, 241–2)
Now it isn’t immediately clear why the fact that Hugh would have the same apparent
memories in the two cases should matter. As far as I can see, the only way it could
matter is if  the following two things were true. First, we are using a temporally local
theory, so the evidence is what Hugh’s memory reports when he is in Shangri La,
not the evidence he acquired on the trip up the mountain. And second, what those
appearances support is solely a function of  things internal to the agent, and not,
say, their connection to the truth. As an evidentialist, I’m committed to a version of
that second assumption - at least, I’m committed to saying that things that over-ride
evidence must themselves be evidence.
Let’s focus for now on the assumption of  temporal localism behind the argu-
ments here. I’m going to offer a series of  arguments against it, starting with a variant
on the Shangri La case.
4 Iterated Shangri La
Here’s a slightly more complicated variant of  the Shangri La example.
Sati walks up to the base of  the paths to Shangri La. “Have some toast
and yeast extract,” says one of  the attendants, somewhat stiltedly.
“Yeast extract?” says Sati.
“Yes, yeast extract. Vegemite or Marmite, your choice.”.
“Must I?” says Sati.
“You must.”
“Well, Vegemite then,” says Sati, recalling fond memories of  having
Vegemite in Australia, and dire memories of  that trip to the English
countryside.
“Good choice,” says the attendant. Sati has her Vegemite on toast, and
heads up the mountain path to Shangri La, as directed. On the way,
she notices a worried looking person standing in front of  a priest about
to ﬂip a coin. When she gets to Shangri La, she asks the attendant
about that.
“Oh,” says the attendant, “he chose Marmite.” Sati looks confused as
to why this is relevant, so the attendant continues. “The priests don’t
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like people who choose Marmite, but they still must let them through.
So they ﬂip a coin to decide whether they will go by the sea or the moun-
tains. Then, if  they went by the sea, they will wipe the memory of  that
trip, and replace it with a memory of  going through the mountains.”
“I’m glad that didn’t happen to me. Lucky I chose Vegemite.”
“Recently,” continued the attendant, “the priests decided to make things
more complicated. They decided they would also wipe the memory of
having eaten the Marmite, and hence facing the coin ﬂip. Instead they
would implant a false memory of  having chosen Vegemite, indeed false
memories of  having preferred Vegemite to Marmite in the past, plus a
false memory of  seeing some other poor sap facing the coin ﬂip. They
really really don’t like Marmite eaters.”
“So all the Marmite eaters get memories wiped?” asked Sati.
“No, only if  the coin lands the wrong way. So some people get to the
top thinking they liked Marmite. But we only tell that memories of
going by the sea will be wiped. In fact, knowing they chose Marmite is
evidence they went by the Mountains, but they don’t know that.”
“It all sounds horrible,” says Sati. “I’m so glad I remembered I liked
Vegemite more than Marmite.”
“Have a good day!” said the attendant, grinning.
I think that Sati’s last statement is correct; she does remember that she likes Vegemite
more than Marmite. Indeed, she knows this in virtue of  her memory. But it’s not
clear how a temporally local theory, either direct or indirect, can get that answer.
Imagine someone, call him Joe, who starts off  in the same situation as Sati at the
base of  the mountain. Sadly, due to an unfortunate unbringing, he prefers Marmite
to Vegemite, so he takes that. And then the coin lands the wrong way, and he is sent
by the sea. Then his memories are wiped and replaced with fake memories when
he gets to Shangri La.
If  a temporally local theory is correct, then presumably Sati and Joe have the
same evidence. And that means if  evidentialism is true, then it is rational for them
to believe the same things. Yet that is implausible; Joe should not be very conﬁdent
that he had the Vegemite, came by the mountains, and so on.
On the other hand, it is overdetermined that Sati can know she came by the
Mountains. The crucial difference between Sati and Hugh comes from the defea-
sibility conditions on the transmission theory. Past memories that p transform into
current evidence that p unless they are forgotten, or the agent gets some good reason
to suspect that her memory is unreliable. Hugh has such a reason; he is a coin ﬂip
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Figure 1.2: Revised Shangri La game; Sati takes the right-hand path, Joe the left-
hand path
away from having faulty memories. Sati does not have such a reason. She knows
that had she had a very different kind of  upbringing, and had she been on the bad
end of  a coin ﬂip, she would have had faulty memories. But a reason to think that
had things been different she would have reason to distrust her memories is not,
itself, a reason to distrust her memories.
Sati’s case is not meant to be a close call. There are lots of  relevant ways in which
her case is different to cases in which the defeasibility clause is triggered. The fact
that two different kinds of  things need to have gone wrong here is relevant. And
the fact that the ﬁrst requires things going wrong for a long long time into the past
is relevant. And the fact that the ﬁrst is only a problem in very different possible
worlds to actuality is relevant. In short, any plausible kind of  defeasibility condition
whatsoever on the transmission theory will mean that Joe’s memories of  going by
the sea are not transmitted, but only an implausibly strong defeasibility condition
will prevent Sati’s memories from being transmitted.
Note that I have not said that Sati can trust her memories because the probabil-
ity of  them being unreliable is so low. That is not the way to formulate defeasibility
conditions. The sense of  probability that is relevant here is evidential probability.
And evidential probability is, as the name suggests, explanatorily posterior to evi-
dence possession. We should not use evidential probability in our theory of  what
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evidence the agent has. Sati knows she grew up liking Vegemite, despite the Shangri
La shenanigans. But that’s not because it is so improbable that she had her memo-
ries wiped. Rather, it is improbable she had her memories wiped because she knows
she does not meet the conditions under which memories are wiped.
So temporally extended theories can distinguish Sati’s case from Joe’s, as intu-
ition requires that they be distinguished. But temporally local theories seem to have
a problem here. Perhaps the problem here is not with the theory of  mnemonic evi-
dence that the the temporally local theories hold, but with evidentialism. Perhaps,
that is, this is a case where we should say that Sati and Joe have the same evidence,
but that this evidence supports different beliefs given the different reliability of  their
memories.
But there is little to be said to motivate such a theory. If  we aren’t going to
be evidentialists, it isn’t clear what the relevance of  a theory of  evidence is. And
if  we are going to say that historical events, like the fact that Joe’s memories were
wiped and Sati’s weren’t, are relevant to contemporary rationality, it isn’t clear what
we gain by having a temporally local theory of  evidence. Either way, we have said
that the existence of  past events is relevant to the rationality of  current beliefs. At
this point we aren’t engaged in much more than a terminological dispute with the
temporally extended theories.
5 Against Indirect Theory
As Matthias Steup (2013) argues, the indirect theory of  memory is implausible. It
says that when one remembers that, say, the Chicago White Sox won the 2005
World Series, there are two things that are needed in order to ground the rational
belief. The ﬁrst is the apparent memory, and the second is some kind of  reason
to think that the memories are reliable. But the only reasons we could have for
believing the second comes from what we have learned about the track record of
memory, or perhaps of  the role of  memory in human functioning. And we couldn’t
be rational in believing those things unless we could rationally rely on memory in
forming beliefs. So we can never rationally form any belief  on the basis of  memory
unless we antecedently have reason to trust memory. And that, plus the indirect
theory of  memory, leads to a vicious regress, and hence to an implausible scepticism.
The argument here is similar in form to an argument that has often been levelled
against the indirect theory of  testimony. This argument traces back at least to Coady
(1995). The argument is that children can rely on testimony to get knowledge, and
hence rational belief, but they don’t have the information or the cognitive capacity to
rationally judge who is and isn’t reliable. So it can’t be, contra the indirect theorist,
that such judgments of  reliability are required in order to get rational belief  and
knowledge from testimony.
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One problem with such an argument in the case of  testimony is that it has re-
lied, historically, on a very impoverished view of  the cognitive capacities of  young
children. It is true that the capacity shown for explicit reasoning by children is often
very weak. But they have rather amazing capacities for implicit reasoning, and there
isn’t any reason to think they could not judge and track reliability of  informants.4
The issue here is not capacity, it is information. No matter how much capacity
you have, you can’t make rational judgments about the reliability of  memory without
information about memory. And you can’t have that information without being able
to use memory. That’s the key problem.
We can use this idea to strengthen the arguments in the previous section about
Sati. If  the indirect theory of  memory is wrong, we have to be a bit careful about
why Hugh can’t know he came by the mountain path. It can’t just be that he lacks
a reason to think his memories are reliable. Rather, it must be that what he was told
at the bottom of  the mountain is a reason to think his memories are not reliable.
It must be the presence of  reasons to doubt memory, not the absence of  reasons to
trust, that is doing the work.
And, as noted, this is a big difference between Hugh’s case and Sati’s. Sati does
not have any positive reason to doubt her memory. She is several steps removed from
the situation where her memories would be in doubt. It’s true that her mnemonic
beliefs are insensitive to the truth in a certain way. Arguably, the nearest world in
which she came to Shangri La by the sea is one where she still believes she came by
the mountains. But any kind of  defeasible, direct theory of  memory will allow for
some rational but insensitive belief.
Assume that our theory says that S can rationally use her memory to believe that
p unless defeaters D are triggered. And S uses her memory to (accurately) remember
:D. That is, she remembers that she is not in a situation where those defeaters are
triggered. Presumably if D were true, her memory would be unreliable; that’s what
makes D a defeater. So there isn’t any reason to think that this mnemonic belief
in :D is sensitive; she may well still have had it were D true. But the direct theory
implies this doesn’t matter, and the direct theory is the only theory on the table given
that the indirect theory leads to implausible scepticism.
Could it be that Sati should not trust her memory because she is, and she knows
she is, in a class of  people whose memories are unreliable? Well, the mere fact that
she is in such a class is not interesting. She knows, after all she is a member of  the
4On children’s capacities to learn, see Saffran et al. (1996a,b) and Gopnik et al. (2001). For appli-
cations of  this directly to the judgments of  credibility, see among many others, Koenig et al. (2004)
and Harris and Corriveau (2011). Jaswal et al. (2008) show that children don’t just track credibility of
informants, they trade off  credibility of  informant against credibility of  what is currently being said.
In general, the lesson from the last 10 to 20 years of  research is that children have more than enough
capacity to perform the cognitive tasks that indirect theorists require of  them.
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class consisting of  her and all people with unreliable memories, and the memories of
that class are as a group unreliable. But that’s not a reason to distrust her memory.
Or, at least, it can’t be on pain of  scepticism. What must matter is that she is in
such a class, and it is epistemologically signiﬁcant. But the signiﬁcant class around
here seems to be the class of  people whose memories have been erased, or who have
reason to suspect their memories have been erased. And that doesn’t include Sati.
She knows she likes Vegemite, and has for a long time, and she knows that only
Marmite-likers in Shangri La had their memories erased.
Here’s what is true of  Sati. She is, right now, phenomenally indistinguishable
from a possible person whose memories are unreliable. But why should that matter?
We all know brain in vat cases are possible, and each of  us is phenomenally indis-
tinguishable from such an unreliable ‘person’. But that isn’t on its own grounds for
doubt about memory. All that she learns from the attendant is that another kind of
brain in vat case is possible. But she knew they were possible all along. The case
isn’t actual and, unless we come up with a trigger for the defeater in the theory of
memory, she has no reason to think it is actual.
6 Argument from A Priority
There is another argument against the temporally local theories, and against both
the direct and indirect theories, that we can derive from the work of  Tyler Burge
(1993, 1997). (I should note that there is considerable dispute about how best to
interpret Burge. I’m not claiming that what follows is the best interpretation, or
the only interpretation, just that it is an interesting argument inspired by, and quite
arguably contained in, his work.)
Tamati is doing a proof. At one stage in the proof  he appeals to Fermat’s Little
Theorem, which says for any natural number n, and any prime p, np  n (mod p).
Using this theorem, Tamati completes his proof, and derives a nice result M. Intu-
itively, Tamati has not just come to know M, but he has come to know M a priori.
But assume, now, that either kind of  temporally local theory is true. At one
stage of  the proof, Tamati had to, at least implicitly, reason as follows. It seems to
me that I remember that np  n (mod p), so (perhaps with an extra premise), np 
n (mod p). And that can’t be a priori reasoning, since the premise about how things
seem to Tamati is contingent and a posteriori. If  the indirect theory of  memory is
right, the extra premise needed about the reliability of  Tamati’s memory will also
be contingent and a posteriori.
It would be a very strange and revisionary theory of  the a priori to say that any
proof  is not a priori if  it relies on remembered theorems without, perhaps, memory
of  the proof  of  that theorem. The proof  of  Fermat’s Little Theorem isn’t difﬁcult,
but it does go through several steps. It is hard to keep the whole proof  in mind at
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once. Even proving it, that is, requires a little memory. On the temporally local
theory, it isn’t clear that it could ever be a priori knowable for any normal person.
And any theorem that required using it would similarly be a posteriori.
Perhaps it could be said that Tamati’s reasoning is a priori because it doesn’t rely
on sense perception, only on perception of  how things seem to Tamati. But some
such perception of  how things seem yields a posteriori knowledge. If  Tamati has a
headache, and notices this at the same time he remembers Fermat’s Little Theorem,
he gets a posteriori knowledge of  the contingent truth that he has a headache, and
a priori knowledge of  the necessary truth of  the theorem.
In short, a transmissive theory of  memory is required to get the result that
Tamati gets a priori knowledge of  the mathematical theorem. As Burge argues,
a transmissive theory of  testimony gets the exciting result that when Tamati goes on
to tell his friend about M, the friend gets a priori knowledge of M as well. If  one
thinks it is intuitive that the friend’s knowledge is a priori, that’s a good reason to
favour a transmissive view of  testimony. But that the friend’s knowledge is a priori
is not as intuitively obvious as that Tamati’s knowledge is a priori, so it isn’t obvious
we must treat memory and testimony the same way here.
I’ll end this section with a note about the dialectic. What would the argument
of  the paper lose if  the arguments of  this section didn’t work? This is an important
question because of  arguments, such as those by Daniele Sgaravatti (2012, Ch. 3),
that the a priori/a posteriori distinction can’t do the epistemological work that it is
traditionally taken to do. The answer is that we’d lose one of  the best arguments
against the direct version of  the temporally local theory, while the argument against
the indirect version would not be signiﬁcantly affected.
Assume for now that one is happy with Tamati’s knowledge, and indeed all non-
trivial mathematical knowledge, being a posteriori in this way, because it relies on
mnemonic knowledge about one’s earlier self. There is still the question of  how
one gets from this knowledge about one’s earlier self  to knowledge of  mathematics.
On this indirect theory, this goes via reasoning about the reliability of  one’s earlier
self. But that reasoning will have to use some non-trivial mathematics, and we’ll
be back in the kind of  circle we warned about in the previous section. On the
direct theory, this won’t be a problem, since there isn’t any challenge in getting from
I have an apparent memory that p to p. That inference is perfectly sound, as long as
one lacks reasons to distrust it. It is still, I think, puzzling that we have to analyse
mathematicians as reasoning this way, and generating a posteriori knowledge. But
they key dialectical point is that sense of  puzzlement is only relevant to thinking
about the direct version of  the temporally local theory; the indirect version is beset
by a host of  further and more serious problems.
Memory 16
7 Argument from Laundering
The arguments involving Sati and Tamati were designed to show that not all ratio-
nal mnemonic belief  relies on inference from the existence of  a current mnemonic
seeming. But neither argument suggested that there was anything wrong with such
inferences. It is fully compatible with what I said about both Sati and Tamati that
they could also try to infer from how things seem to them to facts about how they
got to Shangri La, or about modular arithmetic.
Barnett’s argument for a temporally extended view takes the opposite tack. He
thinks there is something problematic about these inferences, or at least a special
class of  them. And because of  this, he infers that the inference from present seeming
can’t be explanatorily important. And that gets him to a version of  a temporally
extended theory.
So what’s the problem? Here’s the schematic case that he focusses on.
Two Beliefs On Monday you came to believe that p for good rea-
sons that justiﬁed your belief, and on Tuesday you came to be-
lieve that q for bad reasons that failed to justify it (where p and q
are independent). It is now Wednesday, and you have forgotten
nothing, reconsidered nothing, and learned no new relevant ev-
idence. You recall each conclusion without occurrently recalling
your original reasons for those conclusions. (Barnett, 2015, 15)
Again, it’s a bit of  an annoyance to use ‘you’, especially since you, dear reader, would
not do anything so foolhardy as come to believe q. So let’s assume Barnett’s narra-
tion is directed at Kim. And the question is, is Kim’s belief  that q, on Wednesday,
rational? Assume, to make the case most interesting, that this mistaken inference to
q is completely out of  character. Kim is, and knows he is, a very reliable processor
of  information, who rarely makes this kind of  mistake.
The worry is that any temporally local theory will say that Kim’s belief  on
Wednesday is rational. After all, Kim has an apparent belief  that q, and not only
lacks evidence of  his unreliability, but knows he is reliable. Great! But, intuitively,
his belief  doesn’t go from being irrational to being rational just by the passage of
time. It can’t get its irrationality laundered out in this way.
But it isn’t clear how big a problem this really should be. Note that Kim is
supposed to have forgotten nothing. So the evidence on which q was based is still
there. Now allow the temporally local theory a principle that they should want
on independent grounds. That principle is that evidence screens judgment; the
evidential force of  the fact that an agent made a judgment is completely screened, for
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that agent, by the evidence the judgment was based on.5 I just stated that principle
sychronically, so it doesn’t immediately have implications for Kim’s case. But it is
plausible to say that as long as the judgment remains, its evidential force is screened
off  by the evidence it was based on.
Now whether one has a direct or indirect theory, Kim is not obviously com-
pelled to hold on to her belief  that q. And whether or not one believes the screening
principle, the fact that Kim has forgotten nothing means that there is no symmetry
between the cases of p and q. The relevant evidence is different in the two cases.
The only theorist who has a challenge here is one who thinks that only occurrent
states are evidence, and that is a particularly implausible addition to the indirect
theory.
Barnett’s case is different in a couple of  respects than an example Gilbert Har-
man (1986, Ch. 4) uses to draw rather different conclusions. Working through
the differences between them allows us to see something interesting about rational
dilemmas, even if  it isn’t immediately relevant to the debates about memory.
In Harman’s example, Karen ﬁrst draws a conclusion q. This is actually rational
for her to draw given her evidence, but her evidence was extremely misleading. She
then forgets why she came to believe q, and gets new evidence that would show her
the old evidence was misleading. But since she doesn’t remember why she believed
q, she doesn’t know that this new evidence affects her grounds for belief  in q, and
retains the belief.
Harman says that this is rational. Karen isn’t required to keep track of  her
evidence for each thing she believes. That seems right. It is hardly a rational failing
of  mine to not remember precisely why I think that the White Sox won the 2005
World Series; I don’t need to keep that level of  detail in mind. And if  Karen does
not do that, she can’t be expected to adjust her beliefs when the evidence that,
unbeknownst to her, they are based on is undermined.
Harman thinks that our original intuition about Karen’s case is that her belief  in
q is irrational once it has been undermined. But he also thinks reﬂection on real life
cases like Karen’s shows this intuition to be mistaken. The lesson he draws from this
is that something like the direct theory is right; Karen can trust her memories unless
she has a special reason to doubt them, even if  in fact she couldn’t put together a
positive argument for their reliability.
Barnett’s case of  Kim is different than Harman’s case of  Karen in two respects.
Kim retains his evidence; Karen loses hers. And Kim makes an irrational mistake;
Karen is rationally misled by misleading evidence. Are those differences enough to
5I haven’t actually defended this in print yet, but it is correctly attributed to me by Sophie Horowitz
(2013, 25).
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think we should treat the cases differently? Or should we be worried that Karen’s
case, like perhaps Kim’s, is one where intuition is not a reliable guide?
I don’t actually have a ﬁrm view on this. The differences are signiﬁcant. Har-
man himself  thinks that the intuition in Karen’s case is driven by the mistaken as-
sumption that Karen will track and retain her evidence. That’s not true in normal
cases like Karen’s. But it is true, by stipulation, in Kim’s. So that is one big reason
for treating the cases differently. Still, I do worry a little that we’re drifting into areas
where intuition is unreliable.
To make that worry a little more concrete, consider this argument for the con-
clusion that Kim’s belief  in q is actually rational.
1. It would be irrational for Kim to re-open inquiry into whether q, given that
it was settled, and no new evidence has come in.
2. It would be irrational or impossible for Kim to intentionally forget q.
3. Kim cannot change his attitude to q without either re-opening inquiry into
whether q, or by forgetting q.
4. There is some rational attitude towards q that Kim can take.
5. So, Kim is rational to retain belief  in q, since any other possible path would
involve irrationality of  some kind.
Premises 2 and 3 aren’t, I think, particularly controversial, especially if  ‘inquiry’ is
read so broadly that any re-evaluation of q counts as re-opening inquiry. The issues
are premises 1 and 4. Premise 4 is a no dilemmas principle. We’ll return to it later,
though in this context it is notable that Barnett himself  endorses it, as do many other
epistemologists. (Barnett, 2015, 10)
The big issue is premise 1. I think it is true. It is a mistake to go around con-
stantly reconsidering things that one has settled. Once a decision has been reached,
it should be held, unless a reason comes along to reconsider it. That reason may
be evidence that the decision was faulty, or reason to think the decision was badly
made. But the mere passage of  time is not a reason to reconsider, and nor is the
fact that if  inquiry were (properly) conducted, it would yield a different conclusion.
The picture I’m putting forward here owes a lot to Richard Holton (1999, 2009,
2014), as well as to a related idea due to Crispin Wright (2004). Holton argues that if
one has an intention, rationality requires one to maintain that unless a good reason
comes along to reconsider it. The fact that one would not form the intention again
were one to reconsider it is not, he thinks, itself  a good reason. Strikingly, he says
that even in Kavka’s toxin puzzle (Kavka, 1983), the agent who intends to drink the
toxin should not reconsider, because they have no reason to do so. (Holton, 2009,
162–5). And he suggests that we should think of  belief  along similar lines (Holton,
2014). To believe something is to commit to its truth, and we need a positive reason
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to give up our commitments. Wright argues that the sceptic tries to lure us into
opening inquiries we can tell will not be completed. We should resist the lure. We
have no reason to open the broad ranging inquiry into our own competencies that
the sceptic wants us to hold, and good reason to avoid it.6
We can perhaps motivate the application of  these ideas to cases like Kim’s by
thinking of  a similar case involving action.
Ned has been thinking about buying a new bed. He is deciding between
a wood bed and a metal bed. And he just decided to get the wood bed.
This is a bad mistake. He will like the metal bed much better, and this
is in fact clear from the evidence available to Ned. But he’s made up
his mind. The wood bed store is ﬁve miles east, the metal bed store
is ﬁve miles west. And there’s Ned in his car, driving eastward. What
does rationality require of  Ned now?
I think Ned’s in a rational dilemma. It is irrational to drive to the wood bed store
and buy a wood bed. He won’t like it, and it is predictable that he won’t. What a
mistake. But it is irrational to reopen inquiry. He’s made up his mind, and now he
should focus on the road. He hasn’t received any new evidence about the qualities
of  the bed, or any reason to think he mis-evaluated the old evidence. And we can’t
go around second guessing our past decisions all the time. That includes those of
us (presumably all of  us) who make mistakes. It is irrational to be ﬁckle.
So what can Ned rationally do? The arguments of  the previous paragraph sug-
gest he’s in a rational dilemma. If  you want to act rationally, you shouldn’t start
where Ned is. If  he keeps driving to the wood bed store, he’ll irrationally buy a
sub-optimal bed. If  he thinks again about the issue, he’ll be irrationally ﬁckle. Ra-
tionality requires something that is practically impossible; changing his mind about
what to buy without re-opening the issue of  what to buy.
This is a dilemma for Ned, but it is one he could have avoided. He could have
not made the mistaken decision in the ﬁrst place. It may or may not be unfair if
rationality makes incompatible demands on an agent without any chance to avoid
them. But it isn’t unfair to think that agents who make mistakes at t1 are, in virtue
of  those mistakes, left without any good options at t2. Mistakes have consequences.
6Sue Hamilton (2001, 78) says that this idea, that it is wrong to open an inquiry you know you
can’t complete, plays a central role in the epistemology of  the important Nyāya philosopher Gotama.
The discussion of  forecasting in Tetlock and Gardner (2015) might cast doubt on whether the kind of
conservatism I’m endorsing here is empirically sound. There is a suggestion there that people who
tinker with their credal states more frequently end up with more accurate credences. This is a topic
that deserves revisiting as more data comes in.
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Is this inconsistent with evidentialism? I said above that evidentialism says the
rational status of  a belief  supervenes on the evidence that the agent has. Yet now
I’m saying Ned is irrational to change his mind. But if  he had, with the very same
evidence, believed that he should get the metal bed, that would have been rational.
This looks like a counterexample to evidentialism.
Here’s why it isn’t a counterexample. What is irrational for Ned is re-opening
inquiry into what bed to get. It is the activity of  engaging in further consideration
of  the question that it is irrational. Moreover, this is irrational because the evidence
that is available to make this decision does not support it. Should Ned irrationally
engage in this activity, there is a uniquely rational way to ﬁnish it, which is to change
his mind. But that’s not the same as saying that he should, rationally, change his
mind.
I am making a big assumption here, but one I think is true. Careful considera-
tion involves thinking through a large amount of  evidence. Decisions to engage in
careful consideration must be made on the basis of  ﬂimsier amounts of  evidence.
After all, to bring all the evidence one has to bear on a question is to engage in
careful consideration. So a decision to engage in such consideration must not use
all that evidence. So evidentialism must say that the rationality of  a belief, credence,
decision etc must depend on, i.e., supervene on, the evidence available to the agent
when they make that decision. And when deciding whether to carefully consider or
reﬂect on the evidence, very little is available.
That’s why I think Ned isn’t a counterexample to evidentialism. And nor is Kim
a counterexample to evidentialism, even if  there is no way she can rationally lose
her belief  in q. For Kim too faces a dilemma, of  just the same kind. So the argument
I gave for the rationality of  Kim’s continuing to believe q goes wrong at step 4. Kim
has gotten herself  into a mess, and there are no rational ways out.
But note that last conclusion cuts across the theories of  memory we’ve consid-
ered here. The temporally extended theory has, as its distinctive claim, that some
agents have a kind of  evidence that the temporally local theory says no agent has.
But Kim is not one of  those agents. The evidence in question is evidence one gets
when one acquires a piece of  knowledge, and keeps that token mental state across
time. And the relevant fact about Kim is that he has a belief  in q that is well and
truly not a piece of  knowledge. So it doesn’t look like the case should tell the local
and extended theories apart.
What it does so is show that there is a new kind of  argument for the possibility of
rational dilemmas. People make mistakes. When they do, there might be no good
way to undo the effect of  the mistake. And then they’re in a dilemma. We don’t
avoid that conclusion by giving people who don’t make mistakes more evidence.
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8 Conclusion and Future Research
I’ve argued for a transmissive, temporally extended, view of  memory and the evi-
dence it provides. When I remember that the White Sox won in 2005, it is the fact
that they won which is my evidence, not my apparent memory. The role of  mem-
ory is to preserve this fact in evidence, not to give me new evidence for it. Saying
this invites any number of  questions. I’ll end with a list of  several ones that I ﬁnd
fascinating, but which I’m a long way from having answers to, divided up loosely
into questions about metaphysics, and questions about epistemology.
8.1 Preservation
What is it for memory to preserve a belief ? Sven Bernecker (2008) has written on
this at length, and the issue turns out to be much more complicated than we might
ﬁrst suspect. I’m particularly unsure about cases like this one,
Ankati. I haven’t had to change planes at O’Hare for over ﬁve years.
That makes me happy.
Bojan. Are you sure? What about the trip to Vancouver? Or the one
to Hong Kong?
Ankati. Vancouver was a direct ﬂight. And I went to Hong Kong via
New York. But, oh, you’re right, I came back via O’Hare. Sad
face.
At the end Ankati remembers that she ﬂew home from Hong Kong via O’Hare. Is
this a belief  that was stored in memory ever since it happened? If  so, we have to
say that Ankati had inconsistent beliefs at the start of  the conversation. If  not, then
I think it is hard to say that the relevant evidence for the belief  that saddens her
is the fact that she transferred at O’Hare. In such a case, it seems to me that the
temporally local theory is more plausible than in more usual cases.
8.2 Initial Evidence and Over-Riding
The following two questions are related:
 What past states can constitute present evidence?
 What present states can over-ride, or defeat, past evidence?
My instinct is to defend an extremely restricted answer to this pair of  questions.
In particular, S’s attitude towards p at t1 can only be evidence for her at t2 if  the
following conditions obtain.
1. S knows that p at t1.
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2. S does not receive a signiﬁcant amount of  evidence against p between t1 and
t2.
3. S does not receive (undefeated) reasons to distrust her ability to preserve in-
formation between t1 and t2.
But every one of  these points is problematic.
The ﬁrst point might imply some counterintuitive things about people who trust
misleading evidence, such as ‘Karen’ in the earlier cited example by Gilbert Har-
man (1986, Ch. 4). Let’s focus on an even simpler case than Harman’s. Unlike
me, my doppleganger Nairb believes that the Astros beat the White Sox in the 2005
World Series. That’s because his web browser had been hacked on that crucial
October morning, and it reported the wrong results. He hasn’t seen any relevant
evidence since. He has forgotten why he thinks the Astros won in 2005, but has
held on to the belief. Is this belief  rational, and what’s his evidence for it?
The evidence can’t be that the Astros won in 2005; they didn’t. And it can’t
be that his computer reported that; he’s forgotten that fact. Let’s say that it is his
apparent memory that they won, which seems to be the only remaining option.
That would mean that the rationality of  his forming the belief  in the ﬁrst place is
independent of  whether his current belief  that the Astros won is rational. That’s
better than the alternative options, but it isn’t particularly happy either.
The second point leads us into the version of  the dogmatism puzzle that Maria
[Lasonen-Aarnio2014a;] has developed. Assume that signiﬁcant evidence can fac-
tor into insigniﬁcant parts. Pazu knows that p, then gets three pieces of  evidence
e1, e2 and e3 that tell against p. The conjunction is signiﬁcant evidence, the individ-
ual parts are not. But the parts come in sequentially. When e1 comes in, Pazu still
knows p; after all, it is insigniﬁcant evidence. So Pazu can conclude, i.e., know, that
it is misleading evidence. And, intuitively, we can ignore evidence we know to be
misleading. So he ignores e1. And for similar reasons he ignores e2. Then e3 comes
in. Should he still ignore it? Presumably; it is on its own insigniﬁcant, and the only
other evidence was known to be misleading, and so ignored. But it is odd that Pazu
can hold onto his knowledge in p in the face of  these three pieces of  evidence, while
he would have lost knowledge had they come in at once.
Finally, we need to explain why evidence of  unreliability of  mnemonic processes
can block mnemonic knowledge. If  memory was a source of  evidence, rather than a
preserver of  evidence, that would be an easy problem. In general, a source does not
provide evidence to an agent if  the agent has reason to believe that it is unreliable.
The problem is how to motivate an extension of  that principle to memory, which is
in general not a source of  evidence, but a preserver of  it.
We could simply insist that the Shangri La case shows that the preservative role
of  memory can be defeated given sufﬁcient grounds to doubt its accuracy. I think
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that’s right, we can insist that. But there is a puzzle still about why this should be
so. And that puzzle remains work for another day, as do the other puzzles in this
section.
8.3 Externalism
Finally, there are some tantalising possibilities for new angles into familiar episte-
mological debates between internalists and externalists. It is hardly news that this is
possible; Goldman’s ‘problem of  forgotten evidence’ is a familiar challenge to (cer-
tain) internalists (Goldman, 1999). But there might be other ways to make memory
relevant to familiar debates.
If  the temporally extended theory is true, then what is rational depends on some-
thing that is, well, extended. And if  what is rational depends on something that is
extended in time, we might think it is less surprising that is also depends on some-
thing that is extended in space. And that suggests the way to a kind of  externalism.
We can do a bit better than that hand-waving metaphor though. There are
versions of  the New Evil Demon problem for transmissivism. If  transmissivism is
true anyway, that means those problems have solutions. Then we just have to ﬁnd
what those solutions are, and see if  they generalise to solutions to the spatial version
of  the New Evil Demon problem. And if  they do, we might have new ways to defend
externalist theories of  rationality, or at least new motivations for familiar ways to
defend those theories.
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